BUILDING RESILIENCE OR PROVIDING SUSTENANCE: DIFFERENT PATHS OF EMERGENT VENTURES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

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Disaster events threaten the lives, economies, and wellbeing of those they impact. Understanding the role of emergent organizations in responding to suffering and building resilience is an important component of the grand challenge of how to effectively respond to disasters. In this inductive case study we explore venture creation initiated by locals in response to suffering following the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In exploring six ventures we found that two distinctive groups emerged in terms of their identification of potential opportunities to alleviate suffering, their access to and use of key resources, the action they took, and ultimately their effectiveness in facilitating resilience. We offer an inductive, grounded theoretical model that emerged from our data that provides insight into and an extension of literature on resilience to adversity and the disaster literature on emergent response groups, opening pathways for management scholarship to contribute in a meaningful way to this grand challenge.

You want me to tell you what the Haitians did to help Haitians after the earthquake? Not the NGOs? Well, nobody has ever asked me that! There is a lot we did, so much that has gone untold. (Interview)

Transformation is only valid if it is carried out with the people, not for them. Liberation is like a childbirth, and a painful one. (Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire, 2000: 56)

Organizations and communities face high-risk events that are difficult, if not impossible, to prepare for (Gephart, Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 2009). Natural disasters—“acute collectively experienced events with sudden onset” that result in a “catastrophic depletion of resources” (Kaniasty & Norris, 1993: 396)—are a particularly devastating form of high-risk event. Disasters frequently (77% of the time) impact countries that are most vulnerable to the economic and social consequences of such devastating events (Guillaumont, 2010; UN, 2015). Furthermore, disasters often have a regional and even global impact, disrupting or destroying economic conditions (Oh & Oetzel, 2011), threatening business survival (Muller & Kräussl, 2011), and shaping business and society (McEntire, 2014). Despite representing an unlikely event for a specific community, disasters are quite common and occur once per day somewhere in the world on average (Norris, Friedman, Watson, Byrne, Diaz, & Kaniasty, 2002). Given the challenges in preparing for disasters and their devastating consequences, responding to disasters represents a grand challenge (van der Vegt, Essens, Wahlström, & George, 2015).

Most of the research on managing disaster response has focused on the command-and-control approach of first responders—that is, coordinating individuals and organizations to respond to a disaster through “clearly defined objectives, a division of labor, a formal structure, and a set of policies and procedures” (Schneider, 1992: 138). However, recent research has highlighted the challenges of implementing the command-and-control approach (e.g., Drabek, 2005; Marcum, Bevc, & Butts, 2012) and its inability to sufficiently protect communities from disasters (McEntire, 2014) and has begun to focus on the importance of building community-level resilience (McManus, Seville, Vargo, & Brunsdon, 2008; van der Vegt et al., 2015). Resilience is a process by which individuals and/or groups avert maladaptive...
tendencies and maintain “positive adjustment, or adaptability, under challenging conditions” (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003: 99).

To date, disaster-management research has largely focused on the attributes of societies (Aldrich, 2012) or groups (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008) that reflect resilience outcomes in the aftermath of disasters (Bonanno, Brewin, Kaniasty, & La Greca, 2010; McEntire, 2014) but has not sufficiently explored why some (individuals, organizations, societies) are able to adjust to adverse conditions to maintain (or enhance) positive functioning while others fail to do so (van der Vegt et al., 2015). Specifically, there is more to learn about how organizing—linking individuals and broader communities—facilitates adjustment in the aftermath of disasters (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007; Marcum et al., 2012).

Existing organizations’ ability to facilitate resilience (including those of first responder organizations) may be severely limited by a disaster’s destruction of their resources (Marcum et al., 2012; McEntire, 2014). Thus, research would benefit from exploring how local ventures are created in the aftermath of a disaster to alleviate suffering. In the context of disaster response, the creation of local ventures refers to the arrangement of resources and organizational structures in novel ways by those within the disaster zone to alleviate the suffering of victims and can take the form of de novo (new independent) or de alio (new corporate) ventures (Shepherd & Williams, 2014). This form of venturing is consistent with extant conceptualizations of entrepreneurial venture creation, which is a process by which individuals “pursue opportunities without regard to resources they currently control . . . [where] opportunity is defined . . . as a future situation which is deemed desirable and feasible” (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990: 23). The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to explore the processes through which local ventures emerge following a disaster and the consequences these ventures have on community members. Indeed, by focusing on the emergence of local ventures, we hope to provide insights as a basis for actionable knowledge.

In this study, we examine how locals created ventures in Haiti following a disaster. In January 2010, Haiti—already struggling with chronic poverty (UN, 2015)—was hit with an earthquake that leveled approximately 80% of its capital (Port-au-Prince), killing hundreds of thousands of people; displacing hundreds of thousands more; and significantly increasing the population’s vulnerability to disease, poverty, and thus mortality (International Crisis Group, 2013; Zanotti, 2010). The earthquake drew an enormous response from outside governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in an effort to alleviate victim suffering. Billions of dollars were donated, and thousands of NGOs descended on Haiti in an attempt to address Haiti’s problems. In contrast to the focus placed on outside organizations, we focus on how Haitians organized to help fellow community members. Specifically, there is reason to believe that Haitian-led organizing contributed to solutions to the grand challenges presented by the large-scale suffering. Indeed, as a recent report on the crisis in Haiti suggests, “the key to fixing Haiti is that Haitians have to do it” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 14).

THEORETICAL GROUNDING

Based on the above broad objectives, we began by investigating the literature on disaster management. Given our interest in exploring locals responding to disaster, we focused on the literature on resilience to adversity, particularly when disasters were the source of adversity (Erikson, 1976; Gephart et al., 2009). The notion of resilience holds promise for gaining a deeper understanding of disaster management as it can occur at multiple levels as well as across levels (van der Vegt et al., 2015).

Resilience to Adversity

Disasters are crises that create adversity for those in their path (Bonanno et al., 2010; Turner, 1976). Disasters deplete resources (Kaniasty & Norris, 1993), break up and isolate communities (Bonanno et al., 2010), and can be appraised as traumatic (Norris et al., 2002). Although disaster management is often used to try to protect communities from disasters (McEntire, 2014; Turner, 1976), these attempts are rarely successful (Hewitt, 2013). Thus, rather than focusing on vulnerability and protection, a re-orientation toward resilience appears to provide a path to a deeper understanding of the aftermath of disasters (van der Vegt et al., 2015). Indeed, recently, much has been made of communities’ inherent resilience—that is, the qualities a community possesses prior to a hazard that enhance its ability to mitigate threats and function positively in the aftermath of a natural disaster (Cutter, Ash, & Emrich, 2014). Such qualities include their set of networks (Norris et al., 2008), economic and social capital (Aldrich, 2012), local knowledge and values (Shepherd & Williams, 2014), and community capital.
(Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). These resources are important, yet resilience also involves processes for retaining “resources (cognitive, emotional, relational or structural) in a form sufficiently flexible, storable, convertible, and malleable” (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003: 98) to deal with the adversity created by a disaster. However, how are these processes constructed and enacted in the uncertain environment created by a disaster?

Emergent Response Groups—Post-Disaster Venturing

Disasters often generate such considerable destruction that they motivate responses from a number of actors, including governments, non-profits (e.g., the Red Cross, other NGOs), and emergency first responders (e.g., police, fire departments) (Anderson, Compton, & Mason, 2005). However, despite these organizations’ best efforts, many needs go unmet given the often widespread scale of destruction (Drabek & McEntire, 2003). Indeed, disasters can disable first responders’ resources (e.g., destroyed equipment), and infrastructure damage can obstruct them from reaching victims. Furthermore, disaster events are not always interpreted in the same way (Gephart, 1984): those immediately local to the destruction might interpret needs and desired actions differently than those on the outside (Shepherd & Williams, 2014; Williams & Shepherd, 2016). Given established organizations’ limitations to address all post-disaster needs (Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Marcum et al., 2012), it appears that impromptu groups are often formed to fill the void to help victims (Majchrzak et al., 2007). Emergent response groups refer to a collection of individuals “with no pre-existing structures such as group membership, tasks, roles, or expertise that can be specified ex ante” and are characterized by “a sense of urgency and high levels of interdependence” (Majchrzak et al., 2007: 147). These emergent response groups have several attributes, including “unclear and fluid boundaries, fleeting and unclear membership, unclear, fluid and dispersed leadership, highly unstable task definitions . . . and geographic dispersion” (Majchrzak et al., 2007: 150). These attributes are believed to lead to self-organization, improvisation, and the generation of other novel actions to deal with the non-routine nature of disasters (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Erikson, 1976).

Although we have an increased understanding of the attributes of emergent response groups and the desired outcomes of their actions, much remains to be learned about their “internal dynamics” (Majchrzak et al., 2007: 151). Shepherd and Williams (2014) provided an important step in this direction by finding that new ventures (as emergent groups) were created in the aftermath of a bushfire in a country region of Australia to alleviate the suffering of community members (see also Williams & Shepherd, 2016). The act of new venture creation and the notion of an opportunity to alleviate suffering provide an important bridge to entrepreneurship, where opportunity plays a central role in understanding venture emergence (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). The benefits of opportunity exploitation can be for the entrepreneur (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011), for stakeholders (Freeman & Phillips, 2002), the community (Peredo & Chrisman, 2006), and/or nature (Dean & McMullen, 2007). However, there is still much to learn about the different processes by which new ventures emerge in the aftermath of a disaster and the ways these differences impact opportunities to promote the resilience of community members.

Therefore, there are two underexplored yet highly important aspects of disaster management. First, what role do those in a disaster zone play in facilitating the resilience of community members? Previous work has focused on resources in preparation for a disaster or resources provided by outsiders after a disaster, but important implications are likely to arise from considering the processes by which resources are acquired, combined, and used by locals for local victims. Thus, we hope to uncover local resilience processes within the adverse environment created by a disaster. The second under-explored area involves entrepreneurial ventures that emerge in the shadow of designated relief organizations. While previous research has acknowledged the importance of emergent response groups and compassion venturing to the resilience of a community, we wish to understand whether some of these local ventures contribute more to resilience than others and why. Our curiosity leads to the following:

1. How do post-disaster new ventures acquire, combine, and use resources?

2. How does venture creation facilitate the resilience of community members, and why are some ventures more effective than others?

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1 Although there is an ongoing debate about the epistemological nature of opportunity (Davidsson, 2015; Suddaby et al., 2015), both sides agree that acting on an opportunity belief has the potential to generate valuable gains.
RESEARCH METHOD

To address our research questions, we base our work on a qualitative inductive methodology (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This approach enables a detailed exploration of how actors behave in the aftermath of a disaster and to what end. We used the method described by Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton (2013) (e.g., Corley & Gioia, 2004; Sonenshein, 2014) to collect and analyze our data, focusing on the contextual interrelationships regarding new ventures to address existing theory.

Research Setting

Our research setting is venture creation for the alleviation of suffering in the aftermath of the Port-au-Prince, Haiti, earthquake disaster, which occurred on January 12, 2010. Alleviation of suffering refers to efforts designed to reduce the pain of victims (for a review, see Dutton, Workman, & Hardin, 2014; Hansen & Trank, 2016). The 7.0 magnitude earthquake was the worst in Haiti’s history, resulting in extensive loss of life (estimated at 316,000), injury (300,000), and displacement (1.5 million) and impacting one-third of Haiti’s total population (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). The physical destruction was widespread due to inadequate construction standards and a very poor population, which contributed to the destruction of more than 100,000 homes; 1,300 schools; 50 medical centers; the State University of Haiti; and 15 out of Haiti’s 17 government ministries, including the presidential palace (Riddick, 2011). This destruction debilitated Haiti’s already “thin layer” of administrative structures (Zanotti, 2010: 756). Many Haitians faced “serious housing, food, physical security, and health issues” (Riddick, 2011: 244), and the financial impact on Haiti was catastrophic (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010), leading the Inter-American Development Bank to label the tragedy “the most destructive event [any] country has ever experienced” (Cavallo, Powell, & Becerra, 2010: F299).

To fully understand Haiti’s post-disaster challenges, it is important to emphasize that Haiti was experiencing extreme difficulties prior to the earthquake. Haiti is a least developed country that has gone from extreme difficulties prior to the earthquake. Haiti is a least developed country that has gone from crisis to crisis since in 1804, as a colony populated predominantly by slaves, it successfully “overthrew both its colonial status and its economic system and established a new political state of entirely free individuals” (Knight, 2000: 103). However, this new political state struggled to fund the building of schools, hospitals, roads, and other key infrastructure in large part due to an agreement with France to pay compensation to former slave owners for “loss of property” (Schuller, 2007). Haiti has since endured instability in its government, which has been defined as “loose agreements . . . to stave off more serious violence or end an impasse, but none have reached far enough to construct [a solution]” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 1).

In the context of internal government challenges, Haiti has also received extensive international intervention, including billions of U.S. dollars, security support, and thousands of NGOs providing a vast array of services (International Crisis Group, 2013; UN, 2015). Haiti has earned the nickname the “NGO republic” given the “parallel state” made up of international government and NGO organizations seeking to influence national outcomes in Haiti (Edmonds, 2013). As a result of the earthquake’s destruction and at the request of the Haitian government, nearly $14 billion of aid poured into the country. Most of this aid was directed through non-Haitian governments, NGOs, and international government bodies. Indeed, in the aftermath of the earthquake, much of the traditional media and academic focus centered on the effectiveness of non-Haitian responders. Although this focus is understandable given the scale of foreign aid, we wondered what efforts (if any) Haitians had initiated. As articulated by Edmonds (2013: 447), the “earthquake destroyed many things in Haiti, but it did not shatter the pride, determination, and spirit of resistance within the Haitian people.” This curiosity spawned the current research project.

Case Study Method and Selection

Our method for gathering data for analysis was flexible and emergent as we collected information from various sources (Gephart, 2013; Gioia et al., 2013). The selection of cases and data for analysis emerged from statements from individuals, organizational documents, and common “issues” identified by informants as our investigation unfolded. This process culminated in three primary steps. First, we developed generic criteria for the phenomenon we wanted to explore: ventures initiated immediately

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2 Prior to the earthquake, Haiti hosted an estimated 10,000 NGOs, a number that ballooned after the earthquake. Prior to the earthquake, Haiti had “the most privatized social-service sector in the Americas, with over 80 percent of the country’s basic services provided by NGOs” (Edmonds, 2013: 440).
after the disaster by Haitians within the disaster zone focused on alleviating others’ suffering. At this stage, we did not know if these types of ventures were present. However, initial conversations with those in the community, entrepreneurship theory, and reports of Haitian-led activities motivated us to pursue the subject further. Second, we initiated contact with individuals in Haiti through Haitian-Diaspora LISTSERVs, contacts in the first author’s professional network and in the Creole Institute of the second author’s university. Through these connections, we began recognizing that there were a number of ventures created with a shared objective of “responding to the disaster to help address widespread suffering, such as hunger, lack of shelter, and subsequent needs required to survive” (field notes). We conducted 10 exploratory interviews over the phone and on Skype with those identified from the sources mentioned above. These discussions were promising, as one informant noted: “it is a fact that very little has been said about self-initiated activities by Haitians themselves, and all the attention was given to international helpers.”

Based on the initial interviews, we developed a working definition of these ventures but kept an open mind about their nature to help guide ongoing theoretical sampling (Yin, 2009). Specifically, it appeared that new ventures shared at least four broad characteristics that became our initial criteria for conceptualizing our cases (i.e., objects of study [Gephart, 2013]): (1) the groups emerged after the earthquake in direct response to others’ pressing needs, (2) they emerged within the first hours and days after the earthquake, (3) they developed a recognizable organization that included emerging roles and transactions, and (4) they were created and operated in the area affected by the disaster.

Our third step for gathering data involved traveling to Haiti to observe organizations and interview informants face to face. The first author (who is fluent in English and French and has a background in management and entrepreneurship) and a research assistant (who is fluent in Haitian Creole and French and is knowledgeable about the Haitian culture, history, and geography) traveled to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to conduct interviews with the initial contacts, identify additional ventures, and gather observational data. As a result of this snowballing process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), we identified a total of 14 new local ventures. We then identified those that fit our emergent conceptualization of the specific phenomena of interest (consistent with Gephart [2013]). Eight of the new ventures were not oriented toward alleviating others’ suffering and therefore did not meet the study’s purpose. To protect the anonymity of the six remaining ventures, we created a name for each: Sogeun, Seleco, Sagesse, Toujours, Tangage, and Travailleurs.

Data Collection

Our primary data collection spanned nearly two years, including preparation for data collection, interviews, observation, follow-up interviews, secondary data collection including real-time post-earthquake data, and transcription activities. We used multiple sources of data (see Table 1) for the purpose of triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Interviews. Consistent with most inductive research (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Gephart, 2013; Gioia et al., 2013), our primary data source was semi-structured interviews. We purposefully sampled the interviewees to obtain multiple perspectives on how the ventures emerged and operated; the sample included founders, co-founders, team members, employees, and suppliers. We conducted interviews at the informants’ places of operation in and around Port-au-Prince in 2012.3 This approach allowed us to ask questions developed a priori as well as questions that emerged as each interview unfolded. Informants were invited to speak in their preferred language, and all selected Haitian Creole. The interviews were semi-structured into several broad sections, which included: (1) general background information on the individual and a description of what happened the day of the disaster, (2) venture formation, (3) others’ involvement in the venture, (4) communication with customers, (5) resource acquisition, (6) mindset and emotions, (7) social and regulatory factors, and (8) perspectives on the future of the venture.

Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to two hours. In total, we identified and interviewed 41 individuals directly associated with the ventures as well as four individuals who provided support services to those ventures. We continued identifying individuals to interview for each venture until we achieved theoretical saturation. Including preliminary interviews, 23 of the informants were interviewed.

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3 This involved meeting in the back of an abandoned truck with a venture’s leadership team, tents and other temporary structures, church buildings and public spaces, and open fields. Only one interview was conducted in a more traditional Western concept of an “office” as nearly all venture workspaces were in open-air structures.
## TABLE 1
Data Sources for Cases\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Sogeun</th>
<th>Seleco</th>
<th>Sagesse</th>
<th>Toujours</th>
<th>Tangage</th>
<th>Travailleurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informants</strong> (role)</td>
<td>Founder 1 (SO-F1)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 1 (SE-F1)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 1 (SA-F1)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 1 (TO-F1)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 1 (TA-F1)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 1 (TR-F1)(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 in total (510 pages)</td>
<td>Founder 2 (SO-F2)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 2 (SE-F2)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 2 (SA-F2)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 2 (TO-F2)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 2 (TA-F2)(^a)</td>
<td>Founder 2 (TR-F2)(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee 1 (SO-E1)(^a)</td>
<td>Employee 1 (SE-E1)</td>
<td>Employee 1 (SA-E1)(^a)</td>
<td>Employee 1 (TO-E1)(^a)</td>
<td>Employee 1 (TA-E1)(^a)</td>
<td>Employee 1 (TR-E1)(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee 2 (SO-E2)</td>
<td>Employee 2 (SE-E2)</td>
<td>Customer 1 (SA-C1)</td>
<td>Employee 2 (TO-E2)(^a)</td>
<td>Employee 2 (TA-E2)</td>
<td>Customer 1 (TR-C1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other interviews (14) and data**
- Food supplier (1 interview)
- Material and house goods supplier (1 interview)
- Legal support for activists (2 interviews)
- Pre-trip Skype interviews (10 interviews)
- Pre-trip email exchange interviews (30 pages)
- Field notes (105 pages)

**Archival sources (110 pages)**
- News articles (2)
- News articles (3)
- News articles (6)
- News articles (6)
- News articles (7)
- News articles (3)
- Venture reports (4)
- Venture reports (2)
- Venture reports (6)
- Venture reports (4)
- Venture reports (2)
- Venture reports (3)
- Email correspondence (4)
- Follow-up emails and discussion (4)
- Other files (PowerPoint, etc.) (4)
- Follow-up emails and discussion (16)
- Follow-up emails and discussion (10)
- Follow-up emails and discussion (8)
- Follow-up emails and discussion (6)
- Website follow-up emails and discussion (18)

\(^a\) Indicates that the individual validated the inductive model either in person, on Skype, or via email.
twice, and four of them (founders) were interviewed three times. In total—including pre-travel interviews—we conducted 82 interviews. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed in Haitian Creole. The research assistant verified the accuracy of the transcriptions and oversaw the translation of the interviews into English (the assistant was completing a PhD on the Haitian language, linguistics, and culture and is an editor of the most accepted Haitian Creole–English dictionary available). The interviews resulted in 510 pages (single spaced).

**Observation data.** We observed each venture by engaging with and interviewing individuals in their place of business, watching how they held meetings and made decisions, and riding along as they introduced us to their suppliers and customers (whom we also interviewed). After each day of site visits and interviews, the first author and the research assistant engaged in discussions (which were recorded) and took detailed field notes of the day’s activities. A strict same-day rule was followed for field notes to capture immediate impressions and insights that could later shape, supplement, and confirm emerging theoretical perspectives during analysis. We created a total of 105 pages (single spaced) of field notes.

**Secondary data.** We purposefully sampled data from other sources (Gephart, 1993, 2013), which included publicly available archival resources, such as news articles, news videos (in French, Haitian Creole, and English), and academic papers. Similarly, informants shared other data, including reports, marketing materials, business plans, PowerPoint summaries of their activities, and so forth. Archival data like these were mostly created in real time, which helped in building more robust timelines of the organizing process. We identified these materials with the specific objective of triangulating and assessing the validity of statements from interviewees and establishing important timelines. Later in our analyses, we returned to these materials to provide evidence for (or against) the “current” version of the inductive model. Finally, following data collection in Haiti, the first author exchanged many emails and had Skype conversations with the original interviewees to ask follow-up questions to clarify points and validate the emerging model. These data included 110 pages of single-spaced text.

Having gathered data from each of the above sources, we grouped the data by case (~120 pages per case), so all relevant information would be considered during analysis (consistent with Gephart, 1993; Williams and Shepherd, 2016).

### Data Analysis

We structured our analysis following the method described by Gioia and colleagues (2013), which builds on established procedures for open-ended inductive theory-building research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and has been successfully deployed in recent studies (e.g., Huy, Corley, & Kraatz, 2014; Kreiner, Hollensbe, Sheep, Smith, & Kataria, 2014; Nag & Gioia, 2012; Sonenshein, 2014). As is common in inductive research, our analysis was iterative, overlapped with data-collection efforts, and involved repeated comparisons of emerging data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). While iterative in nature, our analysis progressed through several recognizable phases (described below).

**Identifying provisional informant-centric categories, or first-order codes.** We began our analysis using an open coding approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), focusing on keywords reflecting how interviewees perceived the disaster, how ventures emerged, what was achieved, and so forth. At this stage, we kept an open mind to allow the data to speak to us (Suddaby, 2006) while categorizing and labeling informant statements (first-order codes). Codes emerged as we compared units of text and began categorizing and labeling similar groups of text (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The initial codes covered a range of topics, including motivations, venture resourcing, interaction with “outsiders,” outcomes for those being helped, and so forth. As we progressed in this process, we identified concepts that were “repeatedly present” in or significantly absent from our data (Corbin & Strauss, 1990: 7). We began noticing differences in how informants described key factors in their activities, such as the overall objective (e.g., enable people to

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4 The method proposed by Gioia and colleagues (2013) offers several practices that bring “qualitative rigor” and “comprehensibility” to our qualitative analysis (Suddaby, 2006: 637). Specifically, we (1) analyzed our data working from first-order codes to broader theoretical themes, (2) previewed our major findings to help organize our report and to provide clarity and structure to the reader (Gioia et al., 1994; Sonenshein, 2014) despite the fact that these findings emerged from the study itself (Suddaby, 2006), (3) offered insights into our data by displaying representative quotations (Pratt et al., 2006; Sonenshein, 2014), and (4) offered a dynamic model that integrates the static theoretical components as a primary contribution of the paper (Gioia et al., 2013; Huy et al., 2014; Schabram & Maitlis, 2016; Sonenshein, 2014).
work on their own; ensure the government provides housing). These initial observations were captured in field notes. They later influenced follow-up interview questions as we sought to further clarify observed themes. As we iterated between data and coding, we used the NVivo software to associate segments of text in each interview and other data sources. We read and re-read our data and re-coded it many times according to our evolving understanding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) following a recursive process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This allowed us to develop an initial classification system to reflect our informants’ perspectives. As a final step, we labeled the first-order codes (Corbin & Strauss, 1990) to provide data-grounded insight into what would ultimately become our second-order themes and, eventually, our theoretical constructs. In this way, our first-order codes provided an integration of both raw data and our initial interpretation of that data. We then updated the categories, detailing definitions and parameters for each code (similar to Treviño, den Nieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bishop, 2014) to provide us with a way to explore differences between cases across codes. In the end, we re-coded the data four times in its entirety and identified a total of 120 codes.

Having settled on the initial categorization and definitions, we sought further clarification as to different and similar themes found across cases by arranging the data into tables, in which the rows represented the codes and the columns represented the ventures. This process allows for the systematic exploration of differences and similarities across data segments (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). We then assessed a level for each code and, eventually, our theoretical constructs. This process helped us integrate in vivo first-order codes into a more coherent theoretical whole through the identification of 22 second-order themes.

Aggregating first-order codes into theoretical themes (second-order codes). After developing the first-order codes, we again refined our coding procedures (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Specifically, we clustered the first-order codes into higher-order themes to develop, relate, and segregate categories (i.e., “axial coding”) (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). As with the previous stages, this was an iterative process, whereby we repeatedly went back and forth between emerging theoretical themes and the data. We continued this process until all the data were accounted for and no new categories were produced. This process helped us integrate the data across cases and develop a more coherent theoretical whole through the identification of 22 second-order themes.

Theoretical coding, overarching dimensions, and theoretical framework. As the final stage of our analysis, we abstracted the second-order themes into higher-order theoretical dimensions, again iterating between the data and the emerging dimensions for constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Specifically, we used the rating system described above to compare and contrast cases on multiple second-order themes to identify patterns and boundary conditions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Consistent with our overall inductive approach, we revisited the data from the theoretical dimension perspective and began tracing sequences of and linkages between themes, transforming potentially static concepts into what became a dynamic process model (consistent with Corbin & Strauss, 1990). In total, we identified five overarching theoretical dimensions that served as the foundation of our model. Furthermore, we developed a complete timeline of events for each venture and mapped the emergent dimensions onto that timeline.

Figure 1 illustrates the data structure that resulted from our iterative data-analysis process (consistent with Gioia et al., 2013), providing an overview of what we just described and showing how two different groups emerged from our data primarily along the lines of different interpretations of similar concepts. Consistent with other studies using a data structure (e.g., Harrison & Corley, 2011; Kreiner et al., 2014), we showcase the data structure that emerged for both groups. Similarly, and in line with Gephart (1993), we again compared our data across these themes that were repeatedly expressed by informants. We now discuss our findings.

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5 We specifically selected a code-and-rate approach to exploring how cases differed across nodes because the goal of the paper is to “expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” (Yin, 1994: 21). By using a code-and-rate approach, we could assess the various aspects of a case when rating a particular code as opposed to simply counting the number of codes. This approach supports our goal of expanding theory by exploring differences across cases. This approach is also consistent with other qualitative multiple-case study analyses that explore differences across cases (e.g., Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012).
### FINDINGS

**Overview of Findings and Initial Identification of Differences Across Cases**

All our informants described the scene immediately following the earthquake as extremely chaotic and disorienting. This involved observing entire buildings collapse; witnessing violent injury and the deaths of friends, family members, and strangers; ongoing exposure to sickness and injury as victims sought medical attention; anxiety over the lack of security and exposure to violence, and so forth. One informant explained, “As I was walking around that day, I saw those people who had died, and there were piles of dead bodies. There are no words to describe the things that I saw after the earthquake” (TR-E1). Similarly, another person explained the following:

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6 Each informant is coded by the two letter acronym of the venture (i.e., Sagesse is SA) and then a letter and number indicating (1) the type of informant (i.e., founder, employee, or customer) and (2) that informant’s associated number. For example, Sagesse Founder Number 2 is coded SA-F2. Table 1 provides a key for all these codes.

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those around them: (1) searching for and rescuing people, (2) obtaining food, (3) providing rudimentary medical care to the most severely injured, (4) removing and handling the deceased, and (5) providing some form of stable shelter. At this early stage, these activities appeared to be mostly ad hoc and motivated to facilitate survival. One informant (TA-C2) told us that “immediately following the earthquake, we were all just trying to survive the day... We had to keep on fighting to survive no matter what.” As time progressed, however, some individuals began to engage in more organized efforts to attend to victim needs. In exploring differences across informants (as described above), we began to recognize themes that underlined how ventures envisioned alleviating others’ suffering over an extended period and how these differing perspectives influenced organizing and outcomes (see Appendix).

Case Separation: Sustaining and Transforming Ventures

Sustaining ventures. Beyond the initial response, ventures differed in long-term efforts to alleviate others’ suffering. Some ventures continued to emphasize providing for basic survival needs (i.e., food, water, and shelter) in seeming perpetuity. Given the focus on sustaining individuals’ most basic needs for the long term, we began calling this category of cases sustaining ventures. Three of the ventures fell into this category: Sogeun, Seleco, and Sagesse. Sogeun was formed to provide a systematic approach to seeking resources and providing for others’ needs. This included establishing semi-permanent shelter structures on farmers’ land; searching for and diverting resources to their location; and, eventually, organizing to have individuals provide services for sale, including food preparation, hair cutting, and so forth. The leadership team now comprises 20 individuals with defined organizational roles, regular meetings, and formal communication channels. While slightly less structured organizationally (e.g., fewer leadership roles) and smaller in size, Seleco was founded to organize shelter and food for victims in an open space near Port-au-Prince. They too hold meetings, have clear roles, seek to provide for basic needs, engage in micro-commerce activities—e.g., selling food, water, and access to lavatories, and collectively organizing to keep one another safe. Sagesse similarly helped victims move into tents and other structures for protection and worked to acquire food, resources, and services to offer victims. The founding team operates out of a small office space that, while rudimentary, is a substantial upgrade from the work conditions of Sogeun and Seleco. This venture is structured, has an organization chart, and delegates specified work roles.

As we considered our data, we explored patterns and common themes across the core activities of sustaining ventures. Moreover, we interviewed customers of these ventures to gather their perspectives on what they sought from these ventures and how that was being delivered. One of our informants related the following:

We organized ourselves to obtain necessary resources, such as food, water, and housing... We continue to live in tent camps in unsatisfactory conditions... People can live in temporary shelters for three months, but they should not have to live in such conditions for three years (as we have)... but at least we have our lives. (SO-F1)

These statements were reinforced by customers who explained that they were living in tents (organized by the venture) because it was “better than other options” (SO-C2) and gave them an option to continue waiting for longer-term housing. We observed this firsthand as thousands of individuals continue living in tents while relying on daily services nearly three years after the earthquake (field notes). These ventures have an ongoing focus on providing for basic needs.

Furthermore, one founder explained, “Each day we get up, look for resources, and seek to survive... Then we get up and do it again the next day. We are stuck like this” (SA-F1). Indeed, when we asked all three sustaining ventures (SO, SE, and SA) to describe their “daily, weekly, and monthly routines,” they explained that their routines were all “daily” in nature, focused on “what they could get that day to survive” (field notes). Some informants even went so far as to explain that if they obtained enough resources for the day by late morning, they would cease resource-search activities, taking up the activity again the following day. Therefore, the focus on basic needs narrowed sustaining ventures’ orientation to proximal objectives for enhancing victim survival (with little evidence of long-term planning or an envisioned positive future), which drove them to approach the situation “one day at a time.” Finally, our informants explained that “instead of progressing and becoming richer, my people and I have become poorer... but our goal remains to provide at least one meal a day for those in the camp... I will keep doing this even if it takes years to help people” (SO-F1). It appeared that sustaining ventures...
exclusively provided relief—and organized activities geared toward addressing the symptoms of the problems rather than the underlying causes of those problems. Similarly, there was no evidence that these organizations considered other services such as employment assistance or training.

**Transforming ventures.** In contrast to the three ventures described above, another group of cases described the alleviation of suffering as helping individuals transition toward autonomy and self-reliance, suggesting that “success” would mean those they helped no longer needed the venture. As this group repeatedly emphasized the need to help people transform their lives toward self-reliance, we began calling cases in this category transforming ventures. While in the earliest days following the disaster these ventures focused on survival, as time progressed, they transitioned to other activities. The three ventures that were inductively coded into this category were Toujours, Tangage, and Travailleurs. These three ventures were established when individuals gathered at local church grounds in three separate parts of Port-au-Prince to seek shelter in the open space. All three ventures were similar in team size. Like the other cases, these ventures were founded by disaster survivors, all narrowly escaping death and many losing family members.

While in the first few weeks after the earthquake these transforming ventures all hosted victims on non-owned property (i.e., church grounds, open fields), after one to two months (with the exception of Tangage, which took six months), these ventures shifted their focus to transitioning individuals out of a survival state to a path toward self-reliance. This involved coordinating ways for victims to move out of tents and into homes and helping them find work to support themselves over time. Toujours orchestrated work programs through which people could work for foreign agencies. Similarly, they offered work-for-tuition exchanges to local schools, so schools could repair damaged property and children could attend school. Tangage developed an employment service targeting those with varying levels of skills and matching them with appropriate job options. Travailleurs offered medical care services, including psychological care, drawing on local professionals and recruiting visiting volunteers from out of the country.

Our informants described their focus on alleviating suffering in ways that contrasted substantially from sustaining ventures. One founder explained, “We analyzed people’s needs so we could help them moving forward, including housing, jobs, and so forth” (TR-F1). Similarly, other founders (TO-1, TA-1) described that their goal was to identify “pathways” to autonomy, which would naturally require altering activities and goals in parallel with the progression of victims from a crisis state to an autonomous state. Therefore, transforming ventures provided for a broad set of immediate and evolving needs because while they recognized the initial need for resources simply to survive, they transitioned victims toward autonomy and self-reliance.

In terms of time horizon, one founder explained the following:

> We had short-term and long-term projects. . . . Short-term included providing tents, hygiene kits, food, and medical care [first three months]. . . . Long-term [projects] involved plywood homes that they would help build—to maintain their dignity—job training, and psychological support. (TO-F1)

We confirmed these statements during field visits, observing how transforming ventures had all successfully transitioned from providing basic needs and now emphasized longer-term objectives—the means to support oneself on a recurring basis (field notes). Thus, transforming ventures offered long-term solutions to victims that resulted in relief from the disaster and often a substantial improvement from pre-earthquake circumstances.

Finally, after initially helping individuals move back into homes, transforming ventures provided entrepreneurship training to those with limited education (i.e., to sell items on the street) while organizing computer and language training and other opportunities for those with stronger educational backgrounds (TO-F2, TO-E1, TA-E2, TR-F1, TR-C1, TA-E3). In this way, transforming ventures alleviated suffering by pursuing multiple stages of recovery, which involved providing customized solutions that aligned to people’s specific skills and capabilities.

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7 We observed several locations where a transforming venture had previously housed victims in tents (similar to sustaining ventures), but they had transitioned these individuals to greater self-reliance. This observation provided important evidence of the differences between cases. Thus, what had been “tent cities” were now (1) an empty field used for recreation (TO), (2) a church parking lot, and (3) an open space (TA, TR). We documented when these transitions had occurred and confirmed them with secondary data (local news reports) as well as through interviews with customers. Sustaining ventures remain in tent cities today.
while promoting ever-progressing autonomy for those being helped.

As we considered these initial findings, we sought to better understand the differentiating features among these groups of cases. In exploring the differences systematically (as described in our analysis section), we uncovered four primary dimensions that our informants identified as influencing how they organized suffering alleviation and why. Table 2 contains supporting evidence that is specifically keyed to the initial case separation. In the sections that follow, we report on the major dimensions that emerged from the data.

**PROCESSES OF VENTURE CREATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF A DISASTER**

**Identification of Potential Opportunities to Alleviate Suffering**

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, a wide range of crises emerged that required intervention. Informants described a scene where houses were destroyed, and those that were not destroyed were temporarily abandoned (people had left their homes for fear of staying in the structures), leaving the homes and property at risk (field notes). Many suffered physical injury and, without access to proper care, were exposed to disease and ongoing threats. In many cases, much of the nation’s capital and surrounding areas were accessible only on foot (motorcycles, when used, had to be carried at certain points just to navigate debris [SO-F1]). Indeed, with many institutional structures disabled (e.g., government agencies in crisis, the collapse of the headquarters of the primary security force in Haiti) (UN, 2015) and chaotic uncertainty surrounding whether people were missing, killed, or injured (Riddick, 2011), there were many immediate unmet potential opportunities to alleviate suffering (POTAS). POTAS refer to a belief that conditions are favorable to introduce services or products that help address victims’ needs. This definition is consistent with and a natural extension of Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990: 23) definition of entrepreneurial opportunities as future situations that are “desirable and feasible.” As we began exploring our data, we recognized that ventures differed substantially in how they viewed the scope of their POTAS and the methods used to pursue these opportunities.

**Sustaining ventures’ potential opportunities to alleviate suffering.** When conducting our interviews, we were struck by how sustaining ventures described their decision to offer relief with “no end in sight,” how their customers shared this view, and how they arrived at this decision almost from day one (field notes). Specifically, these ventures began their operations by performing basic (yet essential) post-disaster activities, such as burying the dead, procuring water, and helping people obtain shelter on nearby land (SO-F1, SE-F2, SA-F2). We found that after engaging in these initial activities, sustaining ventures organized to access basic resources (from donors) in perpetuity. One venture trained individuals in how to speak with aid workers to facilitate the perpetual acquisition of resources (SA-F1), and another venture taught people “not to rush the aid workers . . . [as] rushing them will make them not want to come back” (SO-E1). The most basic needs were the easiest to identify and were always the most urgent. One founder explained, “The first immediate need was water and food, but . . . people also needed shelter [tents] because they can’t sleep with their young babies in the streets. . . . We recognized this need and continue to provide it today; this is why we organized ourselves” (SO-F2).

Following the earthquake, Haiti experienced a near complete failure in its ability to provide basic services, such as policing, governance, medical care, and so forth. As a result, there was an opportunity for enterprising individuals and ventures to fill the leadership vacuum. As we observed and as was revealed from our informants, providing these services gave ventures substantial power in their communities. One founder explained the following:

> I had experience with campaigning and mobilization work before starting this organization, so it was not overly difficult for me to get the hang of organizing people in the camp. . . . I organized various groups of people here, seeing the government had a weakened capacity. . . . Now, whenever something needs to be done, they call me because I’m the boss. (SO-F1)

While helping others, sustaining ventures identified POTAS to essentially make themselves informal government bodies (or the equivalent) of large tent cities, making all important decisions on food and water procurement, judging crimes, guiding visitors,

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8 The earthquake further paralyzed an already struggling system making a very difficult situation even worse. One supplier explained how prior to the earthquake supplies could be distributed with armed trucks. After the earthquake they required businesses to come to a central depot (protected by armed guards as we observed) to pick up supplies due to security challenges.
and so forth. This was on full display during our site visits as all activity in the camps had to go through their “chief” (i.e., the founder of the venture). The narrow scope of the POTAS thus influenced the ways sustaining ventures viewed and realized their goals of alleviating suffering.

Transforming ventures’ potential opportunities to alleviate suffering. In the earliest stages of the disaster’s aftermath, transforming ventures acknowledged the need for immediate relief; however, we also found that they recognized that they could not (and should not) support people with basic needs over the long run (TR-F1, TA-F1, TO-F2). Rather, they needed to empower victims to “stand on their own feet” (TR-F1). As one founder described, “Initially, we gave people hygiene kits, food, and medical care. . . . This was intended to be done in the short term. . . . Our focus on everything [food, shelter, etc.] was transitional”—that is, moving people from one stage of recovery to the next until victim autonomy was realized (TO-F1, TR-C2, TA-E2). Therefore, in contrast to the POTAS identified by sustaining ventures, transforming ventures had a broader, longer-term orientation when responding to others’ suffering. This is consistent with hopes from the international community that Haiti could experience a “re-imagination” in the aftermath of the earthquake as opposed to returning to the “dysfunctional, unsustainable ways of the past” (Riddick, 2011: 250). Similarly, we found that transforming venture founders expressly diffused decision making to other community members, citing the importance of multiple perspectives on needs and developing autonomy (field notes).

Furthermore, we found that transforming ventures focused on providing services like job and career training as second and third stages of their response, recognizing this would help victims quickly regain positive functioning and perhaps even improve their pre-disaster life situations. This focus was specifically customized to the local environment, matching individuals’ pre-disaster skill levels with appropriate growth opportunities to help with career mobility. These ventures recognized that there were considerable opportunities for locals to obtain some form of employment given the influx of international aid organizations. Therefore, rather than focusing on lobbying donor organizations for resources on a long-term basis, they sought to position community members as workers, such as translators, laborers, and so forth, to provide services to these donor organizations and to support local victims with jobs and (potentially) careers. This orientation toward others (i.e., partners and employers as opposed to donors) and victims (working toward self-help rather than continued reliance on others’ help) influenced how transforming ventures gathered and distributed resources to alleviate suffering.

Finally, our informants described the situation as seeing a need to “help preserve the community” (TO-E1) and fulfill an obligation to others since they had been spared (field notes). One founder explained, “I knew it was my responsibility to help [those in my community]” (TA-F2). Similarly, a venture employee who is a nurse by profession stated, “I took an oath to act, and I take that seriously” (TA-E2). As transforming ventures acted on the obligation they felt to help others, they engaged in an array of activities that later positioned them well for more extensive entrepreneurial action. During our site visits, the founders were often deferential, pointing us toward other actors who helped while repeatedly stating, “We were just doing the right thing for others.” The common theme across these ventures was that the opportunity to help was manifest as an obligation to act and to rescue and then to improve the community.

Social Resources

As highlighted previously, Haiti has a long history of crisis and has relied on outsiders for a range of services (International Crisis Group, 2013). In the aftermath of the disaster, these resource providers increased their presence, providing locals with potential resources. In our data, we found that founders expressed contrasting views on the nature of relationships with potential resource providers (field notes, consistent with Gephart, 1984). We use the label social resources to refer to relationships that provide access to or use of resources to alleviate suffering.

Sustaining ventures and social resources. Sustaining ventures described their relationship with potential resource providers as “distant,” “transactional,” and even “hostile.” While this did not preclude these ventures from pursuing and accessing resources, it did alter the nature of the resources (and the conditions of distribution timing and volume) outsiders were willing to offer (SO-F2, SA-F1, field notes). We found that sustaining ventures had limited influence and control over resources sourced both locally and internationally (SO-F1, field observations) and were therefore highly reliant on transaction partners (as opposed to mutually reliant partners). That is, despite sustaining ventures’ heavy reliance
TABLE 2
Alleviation of Suffering and Case Separation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme and representative quotations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Providing basic/physical needs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Broad set of immediate and evolving needs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>SO-F1: “We tried to organize various groups of people here so as to prevent chaos and delinquency … we organized ourselves to obtain resources such as food, water, and housing.”</td>
<td>TO-F1: “There were people who were depending on rental properties to send their kids to school … we came up with a variety of programs like helping to repair some schools that agreed to enroll the children [of affected people] that couldn’t afford it.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE-F1: “In reality people have had to organize themselves individually in whatever way they could to survive. So we have squatted here and this is where we attempt to survive, by providing clean toilets and access to lower cost water and food … [for example], we got together and managed to buy a water truck and shared it.”</td>
<td>TA-F1: “Beyond just basic needs, we tried to put good principles to practice, such as housecleaning, personal hygiene, and other important daily routines.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA-F1: “After the earthquake we rescued people from under the rubble … we distributed supplies such as water and food … we also set up mobile health clinics.”</td>
<td>TR-F1: “Relief efforts were guided by the notion that people had multiple needs … we first provided food, and then after sent psychologists to work with patients and explain what had happened and what they should do.”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Proximal-oriented</strong></td>
<td><strong>Long-term solutions</strong></td>
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<td>SE-F2: “Our leadership committee is working to apply for assistance for the people [from the government and other organizations]. You know that hygiene and sanitation are pressing needs for people right now [three years on], and so we are working to secure aid in this domain.”</td>
<td>TO-F2: “There were many jobs available but the problem was that [people] didn’t have the qualifications to get them … [specifically], they didn’t know English or computers, and many of them had never worked. We decided to address those problems [with career training].”</td>
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<td>SE-E2: “The 22nd Article of the Constitution states that the Haitian government recognizes the right of its citizens to have a house in which to live. We realized that many Haitians were not aware of this constitutional right … we fight to force the government to keep its word.”</td>
<td>TA-F2: “There were some people whose homes were still standing, but they had the idea that the longer they stayed in the camp, the more chance they had at getting aid. They thought that they could get more food, tents, mattresses, and even money if they stayed … but things don’t work like that, our goal was not to become a long-term camp, but to get back to normal.”</td>
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<td>SA-F1: “We looked for people who had water trucks, tanks, and other materials available, and we asked them to give to us … We pressure the government [for a] water project in our area.”</td>
<td>TR-E1: “We helped people prepare resumes to get jobs with NGOs … we helped people find jobs as interpreters … medical assistants … removing concrete blocks, iron bars, and other rubble from streets and building sites, and so forth.”</td>
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<td><strong>Exclusively providing relief</strong></td>
<td><strong>Multiple stages of recovery</strong></td>
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<td>SE-F2: “Women and children are in a bad condition … because as we say in Haiti: ‘birds do not work, but they eat and drink’ … Since the earthquake we look for someone to give them a little something to tide them over, that puts them in a better situation.”</td>
<td>TR-F2: “Since the earthquake I have traveled Haiti extensively and this has helped me to better understand the unemployment situation in Haiti. This understanding has enabled me to know how to better help people secure employment … this allows them to be self-sufficient, or their own master … So that is basically me, who I am and what I do, going beyond basic needs to help them be autonomous.”</td>
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<td>SO-E2: “I was here from the beginning when the committee was first formed … We are still continuing the fight today for food and housing, and we will not become discouraged, even when we search and do not find anything … Our role in this community as a leadership team [in this capacity] is long-term.”</td>
<td>TO-F2: “First people lived in tents on the church lands, but after a time, they transitioned to subsequent stages of recovery, such as small wooden houses covered by tarps, which they later replaced with wood and sheet metal roofing … temporary tarps only last so long … we always met to discuss the next stage of transition for people.”</td>
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<td>SO-E1: “Our mission has always been providing basic needs to those living in the tents, like housing and food. People are not just asking for houses, they are asking for public housing with access to social services. The people want the government to provide these services so they can enjoy adequate living conditions … we provide a space to wait for those services while we lobby [going on three years].”</td>
<td>TR-F1: “We provided relief in stages … first people needed psychological help or counseling to prevent mental and emotional trauma, and food … next people needed long-term solutions for housing … We then worked to transition people to be positioned for jobs …”</td>
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on outsiders for donations, equipment, and regular sustenance (as we observed onsite), these interactions were not relationship based, making the long-term presence of services or resources uncertain. As sustaining ventures struggled to survive and provide for others, they desperately sought to establish connections to bring in critical resources and, understandably, often had to rely on extreme measures to achieve their objectives. Given the lack of established ties to outsiders, these ventures continue (as of the writing of this study) to pursue daily resource donations, albeit sporadically. One founder explained his situation:

On January 12, 2010, I was right over there across the way [motions across the field]. The majority of these people lived across the street as well. . . . I was here in this area right when the earthquake hit. . . . I led campaigns to bury the bodies—there was no time to sit around and reflect because we had a problem on our hands. . . . I had to perform amputations in the field. . . . Since all the people were around, I took initiative to form a committee to continue acting, and we are still here today. (SO-F1)

This venture, like other sustaining ventures, began identifying POTAS not as the result of prior relationships as sources of information (on suffering or available resources) but based on the creation of new connections with individual victims. As another informant explained, “We heard of other organizations by word of mouth as we had no prior contacts” (SA-E1). Without established contacts, the transaction-based nature of these relationships took its toll: “Many organizations [NGOs] have come to visit us, but then we never see them again. We never see them, you understand? We need people to collaborate with us, but we don’t have access to those people” (SA-F1). Although these ventures acknowledged that they needed new social ties, attempts at connecting with both local and international groups were met with only limited success. As a result of this limited progress, outsiders were often blamed and viewed negatively and with distrust, which had an impact on subsequent resource acquisition and the scope of the POTAS. Therefore, while these ventures were given important resources from the outside, the lack of long-term relationships with outsiders appeared to generate a sense of resentment for the very groups (e.g., NGOs, foreign governments) that provided the resources, albeit sporadically.

**Transforming ventures and social resources.**

One founder explained that he “immediately rallied with those in his community . . . identifying the missing and the dead while setting up plans for the future” (TA-F1). Similarly, another founder explained that “friends in the U.S. contacted me asking ‘what can we do?’ I told them, and they acted immediately . . . ranging from medical supplies to transportation and training” (SE-F2). Consistent with these quotations, our transforming venture informants emphasized that founders relied on strong local and international relationships as well as loose connections through mutually shared groups (e.g., church membership, NGOs, etc.). Consistent with theory on social networks (Burt, 2005), the founders of transforming ventures highlighted their use of and heavy reliance on deep connections with locals (i.e., local ties) as well as their extensive access to and use of both strong (i.e., long-term, reciprocal interpersonal relationships) and weak (i.e., limited-time acquaintance-oriented relationships) (Granovetter, 1973) international ties. These connections resulted in multi-national teams led and directed by locals, with locals and outsiders seen as key collaborators, allowing ventures to leverage personal relationships toward new ends. As
noted in our field observations, this set of social resources allowed for a broader perspective in establishing these ventures’ orientation—thinking beyond the founders’ immediate surroundings, developing relationship-oriented interactions with local and non-local stakeholders, and broadening the scope of potential services for both the short and long term. For example, one founder explained how his access to local connections influenced the funding of his POTAS:

We used a lot of local contacts. For example, there was a man who had helped with previous construction projects, including working on all of our church buildings, and he has an engineering company. This man opened up his house for our use in relief efforts, and we housed groups of foreign volunteers there when they came to Haiti to help out. . . . He also had a large depot full of construction materials that he lent to us for our use. We used the depot as a receiving point for all of the food trucks that came from the DR [Dominican Republic]. (TO-F2)

Similarly, another founder explained that his venture’s international network provided access to resources: “I was already friends with these people [from the United States] since before the earthquake. . . . After the earthquake, they just asked me what they could do to help. I told them what to do, and they went right into action” (TA-F2). One customer described the collaborative approach taken by a transforming venture: the venture worked with “the Americans, French, and Canadians, who genuinely showed interest in learning who we were as a Haitian people and what we needed before they got to work” (TA-C1), which resulted in the formation of POTAS. The nature of social resources (i.e., being relationship based versus transaction based), therefore, was critical in helping ventures identify and resource POTAS for transforming ventures in that they were directed and controlled by locals and were exchanged through relationships based on trust. These relationships likely helped reduce the extreme uncertainty, provided clear and consistent access to external resources, and enabled transforming ventures to focus on stages of goals as they built momentum with partners. In contrast to sustaining ventures, transforming ventures described relationships with outsiders as “collaborative,” “long term,” and “rooted in similar goals and belief systems” allowing them to go beyond transactional exchanges (field notes).

**Founding Mindset**

Each of the informants we interviewed mentioned factors that motivated and “framed” their actions. When analyzing our data, we revisited these responses and began recognizing common explanations for founders’ motivators, goals, and orientations as their ventures emerged. We labeled these themes **founding mindset**, which refers to the founders’ primary motivation, frame of mind, or “driving force” (field notes) for creating a new venture in the aftermath of the disaster. We found that all ventures had a baseline mindset of helping those in need, but beyond this general perspective, there was a substantial difference in how informants explained why they took action and how that action influenced venture decisions and operations.

**Sustaining ventures’ founding mindset.** Founders of sustaining ventures explained that their motivation was “natural” because “We are Haitian! The Haitian people will always keep their heads up and keep on fighting to survive no matter what because our national identity is what makes us strong as a Haitian people” (SA-F2). Several founders began the initial interview explaining that their story “could not be understood without first explaining Haiti’s unique history of overcoming adversity” (field notes). They then recounted Haiti’s history leading up to the earthquake to put it (the earthquake)—and their response—in proper perspective. This perspective is understandable given Haiti’s unique history of having the first successful slave-led revolution and ongoing resilience in the face of institutional failures and extreme poverty (Knight, 2000). As one founder contextualized:

Despite the horrible events that had transpired . . . The history of the Haitian people does not allow one to become discouraged because we know we have to do what is necessary to survive. . . . Our ancestors survived crossing the Atlantic without food to arrive here [on slave ships]. That experience was more terrible than an earthquake. . . . The former slaves won independence and were never discouraged. Thus, a small thing such as an earthquake cannot make me, a descendant of these people, become discouraged. (SO-F1)

When we asked other sustaining ventures about this unique “Haitian spirit” they confirmed that “this spirit is in us as well” and emphasized how this Haitian patriotism motivated their actions (SA-E1, SA-E2, SO-E1, SO-E2, SE-E1, SE-E2). One founder explained, “My motivation was that I am a Haitian, and I am a patriotic person. I couldn’t stand there and watch my country in crisis” (SA-F1). Similarly, another founder first introduced himself by describing his ancestry, a process he always follows when explaining his work to others. He explained, “I always introduce myself in the context of my ancestry because
I am very proud of my country’s history” (SO-F1). This patriotism was tightly intertwined with a distrust of the government and non-Haitian organizations and countries—even to the extent of blaming these institutions for the earthquake itself (SE-F1, SO-F1, SA-F1, SA-F2). This national pride led sustaining ventures to “do whatever it takes to survive” (SA-F1, SE-F1, SO-E1), just as their ancestors had. They saw deep connections between their post-earthquake actions and Haiti’s history of overcoming tragedy.

Our informants also referenced a troubled history with corruption, which influenced and shaped an injustice mindset—a strong belief in the need to “battle to fight for justice for [our] people,” including “vacant land that was supposed to be for the people,” housing, and more (SO-F1). As this insight emerged from our data, we were intrigued at an apparent contradiction: whereas sustaining ventures spoke strongly about their independence and national pride, they also expressed an entitlement to outside resources as “reparations” for historical injustices (SO, SA, and SE ventures):

We are not here to start fights . . . but we demand that victims receive reparations for the injustices they have suffered [He saw the earthquake itself as a criminal act]. . . . The Haitian government along with foreign governments need to provide land on which those rendered homeless by the earthquake can resettle. . . . I have found that there is a lot of land, and we demand that these people receive it for reparation. (SO-F2)

Similarly, another founder explained, “There is no organization that takes care of us in reality. . . . If foreigners would just get us the supplies most necessary, the population’s needs would be met” (SA-F2). While seemingly contradictory, this attitude is consistent with research on equity theory, which suggests that individuals in inequitable relationships (as a beneficiary or a victim) can feel distress; that is, “recipients [of aid] react negatively to a benefit,” which can result in resentment or anger toward benefactors (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983: 118).

The distress and distrust of sustaining ventures’ founders coincides with Haiti’s “historical and current allegations of corruption of various levels in the Haitian government [and international governments and organizations]” (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010: 4); history of foreign oppression, including slavery and its associated atrocities; and ongoing distrust and dysfunction pertaining to property ownership, distribution, and use (Knight, 2000; USAID, 2015). This mindset led sustaining ventures to focus on real and perceived injustices, and they saw their role as demanding resources as a patriotic duty, soliciting outsiders to “do more” to assist them in addressing the most pressing and visual forms of suffering.

**Transforming ventures’ founding mindset.** Informants from transforming ventures described their mindset and motivations for action in terms of “doing what was right,” “fulfilling obligations to the community,” and “helping those who suffered more than we had” (field notes). Even after repeatedly asking these informants if national pride or historical injustice factored into their founding mindset, they all responded with a similar response: they were just “doing the right thing to help other people” (TO, TA, and TR) as “people from all countries help one another; Haitians are no different from others in this sense” (TO-E2). Informants explained:

I have a passion for helping people; it is what I love to do. I am not someone who will only help others out for money because I feel that if I am getting paid for what I do, I am not really helping the person. If I’m going to help someone, I need to do it with all my heart. (TR-E1)

I should have died [when the roof collapsed inches from my head]. . . . This has been pretty hard to deal with. However, no matter what obstacle is presented . . . this [helping others] always gives me strength and drives me. . . . This mentality is shared by those in our organization. (TO-F1)

Finally, another founder explained, “My approach was to help enable [people] to change their own situation—to obtain food, housing, and other necessary resources [long term] through their own ingenuity and capabilities. . . . This was my desire—to help my own people!” (TA-F2). Given the direct and persistent emphasis on helping people at various stages of recovery, we labeled this a prosocial mindset, in which motivations and actions were driven by a desire to help others progress toward autonomy, which influenced the identification and pursuit of POTAS.

Another informant of a transforming venture explained, “Many people are waiting in tents for a payout9 that may never come. We encouraged people

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9 Nearly all informants referenced government programs that offered financial incentives for leaving tent cities. These programs had facilitated closure of tent cities in the first 18 months after the disaster, and some believed more payouts were coming. As a result, many were motivated to await payouts; in some cases, individuals moved into tent cities from outside the disaster area in the hopes of obtaining housing funds. In other cases, some occupied multiple tents in hopes of higher payouts. These are some of the reasons the government slowed such programs (field notes).
to work and improve their situation. This helped them feel courage and many have improved their lives” (TR-E1). Indeed, one founder explained how the desire to help others achieve autonomy shaped his venture’s actions and how that contributed to positive outcomes:

[Although] there haven’t been any huge changes or improvements [nation-wide], we are still better off than we were in January 2010, and I know that things will continue to get better. Today, more people have jobs and businesses than back then, and this was the motivation I had all along! . . . This is something that Haiti and Haitians want—a chance to find a job and to be independent instead of constantly having to ask for food and other forms of international aid. (TR-F1)

As documented in our field notes and observations from site visits, transforming ventures had managed to move victims through stages, including offering permanent housing solutions, job training, education options, and so forth, going well beyond providing basic sustenance. As we conducted second-round interviews with transforming ventures, we asked about the importance of self-reliance in their model. All founders explained that this was essential as their goal was not to meet individuals’ basic needs long term but to enable them to get back on their feet and, if possible, make something more of their lives than before the earthquake (TO-F1, TA-F2, TR-F1). This founding mindset led transforming ventures to draw on a wide set of resources to identify and exploit POTAS that reflected a longer-term perspective on help.

Resourcefulness

From Haiti’s resourceful revolution to become a self-governing republic to the present, Haitians have found a way to survive and overcome obstacles. As we conducted our interviews, we observed this firsthand, watching individuals harvest spare metals, cultivate food, repurpose materials for shelter, and do whatever it takes to live. Similarly, given high levels of government and institutional corruption and uncertainty, individuals are often left on their own to obtain basic education, food, housing, and healthcare. As we interviewed informants and visited sites, we recognized that nearly all our informants came up with creative solutions to challenges despite possessing few, if any, resources. We labeled these creative actions resourcefulness (consistent with Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005). Indeed, while conducting our interviews, it was not uncommon to observe individuals arriving with raw materials that they had found nearby or team members interacting with international collaborators in the hopes of accessing unique skills or insights (field notes).

Sustaining ventures’ resourcefulness activities. As we analyzed our data, we recognized many founders of sustaining ventures indicated that they pursued resources in ways their ancestors had, fighting for rights through peaceful (yet aggressive) means to enable survival (field notes). Indeed, the appropriation of non-owned resources was the most significant observation we had when visiting sites. One founder explained the issue:

We faced a problem, which was that [our operations] were set up on private lands, and the landowners wanted to reclaim their lands. The proprietors started pressuring us to make all the people leave. . . . This was a big problem we faced and overcame by staying on the land. (SA-F1)

Sustaining ventures viewed the appropriation of others’ land as “a right” that was “owed to us by the government and wealthy land owners” (SO-F1, SO-E1, SE-F1, SA-C1). This attitude needs to be understood in the context of the uncertainty surrounding land ownership, the sheer number of homeless victims, and the means by which a small number of elite had come into possession of much of the land surrounding Port-au-Prince (Riddick, 2011). In taking resourceful action, these ventures entrenched their claim to the land by creating a degree of infrastructure on the land that reduced the likelihood of returning the land to legal owners: building meeting “houses” for group gatherings (SO-F1, SE-F1), funding “liquor shops” where people could procure bootleg alcohol (SO-E2), and so forth. One founder explained, “We would like to build out a reservoir for water. . . . We also want to have a fish hatchery; we believe strongly in animal husbandry. People could use this fish hatchery as a business and also a source of food” (SE-F1).

One customer who is a recipient of the venture’s services told us the following (which was confirmed by other customers): “Where will we be in five years? . . . We will still be here in two, three, four, 10, even 30 years from now [living the same way on this land]” (SO-C3). These ventures were following a pattern of

10 As indicated previously, billions of dollars have flooded into Haiti over the years with very few institutional results. In 2006, “Haiti was only ahead of Burma and Iraq as the countries with the most widespread corruption” (Roc, 2009), which has resulted in stagnated efforts to address Haiti’s “basic needs such as shelter and basic medical care” as well as “long-term needs such as education, good governance, and economic reconstruction and growth” (Wilets & Espinosa, 2011: 181).
land acquisition in a way consistent with Haiti’s history: seizing property by occupation. As one informant explained: “it is OK for us to occupy these lands because they are under the control of the rich elite . . . All of us here are children of the land, and we all should have the right to a place to live.” Therefore, sustaining ventures resourcefully appropriated non-owned resources for the long term, which influenced both the subsequent identification of POTAS and entrepreneurial actions. While these actions offered victims access to services that provided some of the basics of life, they also made it less likely that people would leave this largely “makeshift” setup.

Second, we found that as individuals engaged in a daily search for basic resources, the POTAS became further entrenched in providing relief. For instance, one founder told us:

[After getting settled on the land] we bought a truckload of water, put it in the container, and then sold it to the population at a low price . . . This is a way to ensure that we will always have money for water to continue filling up the storage tank with water . . . We sell it for 4 gourdes [$0.08] a bucket, but on the street, it is sold for 5 gourdes [$0.10] a bucket. (SE-F1)

Similarly, one employee explained how he began taking action:

We constantly searched for food . . . Every time you find someone who gives you a little something to tide you over, you are in a better situation—you keep searching every day. (SO-E1)

Thus, sustaining ventures maintained an enduring resourcefulness mindset—searching for resources daily, constantly repurposing readily available resources, and living in the present.

Third, as noted by an employee of a sustaining venture, “A big part of what we do is bringing people [NGOs, government agencies, etc.] to the camp to provide resources” (SO-E2). Similarly, a founder explained the importance of lobbying for the delivery of resources:

I dressed in a manner similar to a military personnel and went to the military to get gasoline . . . They assumed I was part of the military . . . I told them I needed gasoline, and they told me no problem, they had a lot of gasoline. There were obstacles, but I overcame them . . . Many people were afraid of the military . . . but not me. I told others I’m not afraid of the military because I am in the military too! I did this often to get resources. (SA-F1)

Similarly, an employee described his actions in procuring water:

I found gallons of water in destroyed stores and broke down the walls with a tractor I took. I then took the gallons and brought them back . . . We had to act quickly and resourcefully because we felt a sense of responsibility to find solutions to all of these problems. (SO-E1)

Other accounts described commandeering water tanks (SE-F1), deceiving foreign NGOs into dropping off food trucks (SA-F1), and stealing vehicles and other equipment to survive (SO-E2, SA-F1). Some founders (SA-F1, SO-F1, SE-F2) described how they threatened NGOs, border agents, and others with violence unless they gave up food containers. The perpetual, permanent, and often deviant resourcefulness of sustaining ventures shaped ongoing activities and ultimately had an impact on how they pursued POTAS. Importantly, while sustaining ventures’ deviant behaviors—non-sanctioned activities to accomplish their ends (consistent with Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009)—provided resources to sustain victims and enabled ongoing survival in an incredibly hostile

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11 Property rights in Haiti are very uncertain, leading some to take matters into their own hands. “[N]o one knows how much land is still owned by the government . . . which could be as much as two-thirds of the entire country” (Riddick, 2011: 255). Similarly, a “small elite owns most of the land in and around the capital,” which presented considerable problems when attempting to house the millions of homeless as the government could not account for which land it owned (Riddick, 2011: 261).
environment, they did not provide upward mobility for those being served.

**Transforming ventures’ resourcefulness activities.** Similar to sustaining ventures, transforming ventures also described many actions that could be identified as resourceful activities that they argued were critical during the recovery process.

First, as ventures used existing organizational structures and resources in early resourceful actions, informants continuously acknowledged that this use was *intended to be temporary*. One founder told us that “The church ground [which we temporarily occupied] was supposed to be primarily a place of worship and not a long-term camp” (TO-F2). Similarly, one founder explained how he helped set up a surgical center in a nearby building to provide immediate care to those with severe and life-threatening injuries as hospitals were “overflowing and mostly full of dead bodies” (TA-F1). This attitude about the temporary occupation of property influenced how transforming ventures approached the problem of shelter: they transitioned individuals out of tents in as little as three months (and no later than one year) after the earthquake. For those who had titles or verifiable claims to property, transforming ventures helped them rebuild their homes, and for those who had been renting, these ventures helped them find new rental properties. Transforming ventures accessed, used, and then returned non-owned resources, including land, medical equipment and facilities, and buildings (TO-F2).

Second, an employee of a transforming venture explained that he and his team worked tirelessly to help people make incremental transitions toward autonomy, with a focus on making investments in the future through education or other solutions that addressed the root cause of victim suffering (including poverty). He explained the following:

> Each time the problems or issues changed, we had to meet together to plan how we were going to resolve the root causes of the new problems that had come up. . . . We continued holding meetings with the needs evolving until our primary goal was met, which was people were again living in their own homes and on their own lands [living autonomously]. (TO-E1)

Similarly, one founder stated:

> [Many other groups believed that] NGOs would continue giving them things for free [indefinitely]. . . . Because of this, there are groups of people who are still living in tents even to this day [on land they do not own]. . . . We did not function this way toward those we helped; we wanted them to be self-reliant by getting training, education, or what they needed to function on their own. (TR-F1)

Transforming ventures recognized that a state of perpetual resource seeking would not lead to a long-term resolution of suffering. As such, these beliefs about POTAS had a strong influence on implementing difficult transitions, such as encouraging people to leave camps and begin autonomous living—a transition from *resource seeking* to *resource investment*.

Third, some transforming ventures provided assessments of houses’ safety, allowing some individuals to repair homes that were damaged but not destroyed (TO-F1, TA-F1):

> We conducted surveys and found that not everybody had lost their houses. For example, my own house had cracks in the walls, but it was not actually destroyed in the earthquake. . . . Some people were in similar situations and simply needed shovels and mops to clean their home and patch cracks. . . . Others were helped to find new rentals if they had been renting. . . . Others were helped to replace homes they owned on new lands after showing proof of title. (TR-F1)

This customization did not come without challenges. In many cases, people had hoped for new homes or a payout from the government despite the relatively limited damage to their homes. In these cases, transitions were important but difficult to enact. For example, one customer noted:

> It was hard leaving the tents; things were desperate . . . but I [got help fixing] up my house and later helped with other projects like delivering food and water. . . . This led to a job with an NGO, which would not have happened if I stayed in a tent! (TO-C2)

Therefore, we found that transforming ventures were resourceful in *customizing* their approach to meeting critical basic needs with a focus on helping individuals rebuild their lives in such a way that they were better off than before the disaster—“build back better.”

Finally, one founder explained that rather than raiding others for resources, such as food and water, individuals pooled what they had on hand to make it through the most difficult times:

> Imagine that you have flour, I have salt, and someone else has oil, and a fourth person has rice—it doesn’t make sense for us to each try to make food with our limited resources. Instead, we pooled all of our food supplies together and cooked food for everyone; we distributed it equally among everyone even if each
person got only one or two spoonfuls. . . . You have to 
know each person’s talents and capabilities . . . You 
need doctors to form a medical committee, and you 
need lawyers to form a legal committee. . . . We knew 
people’s capabilities, deploy them. (TR-F1)

Another founder explained that his team would 
bring resources into Haiti from the Dominican Re-
public at night to avoid having the materials stolen. 
Given the extreme uncertainty and lack of food it was 
common for food trucks to be attacked, overrun, and/or 
redirected to other areas:

We traveled to another commune called La Vallée de 
Jacmel. We finally arrived at 4:00 a.m., dropped off the 
supplies, and then turned right around to go back 
without a break . . . . There was nobody around on the 
routes to see that we were carrying valuable food 
supplies—we were able to travel with no hindrances. 
(TO-F2)

These creative approaches to resource access and 
distribution allowed transforming ventures to access 
and activate their relationships to gain critical re-
sources to pursue POTAS. Thus, transforming ven-
tures displayed both creative and legal techniques 
for resource acquisition.

Therefore, transforming ventures emphasized the 
importance of transitioning from a resourcefulness 
mindset to more of an investment mindset (TO-F1, 
TR-F1). That is, they recognized that creatively 
making do with what they had could only take them 
so far and that for people to truly recover, they would 
need to make difficult transitions requiring money, 
time, and other investments (field notes).

In Table 3, we summarize the representative quota-
tions that illustrate the categories and themes that we 
developed in inductively arriving at our overarching 
dimensions described above. These quotations were 
selected because they highlight the preponderance of 
evidence.

**DISCUSSION**

We began this paper seeking to understand if, how, 
and why emergent ventures contribute to resilience 
in the aftermath of disasters. Specifically, we asked: 
(1) how do post-disaster new ventures acquire, com-
bine, and use resources, and (2) how does venture 
creation facilitate the resilience of community mem-
bers, and why are some ventures more effective than 
others? Indeed, as one founder exclaimed (and as 
was reaffirmed by nearly all our informants), “Much 
of the story of the earthquake . . . is missing the 
Haitian story, the story of locals who rose up to help 
fellow Haitians in need” (SA-F1). In detailing the 
answers to these questions that emerged from our 
data, we first summarize our findings (see Figure 2 
and Table 4) and then discuss the theoretical and 
practical implications. In particular, we explain 
how this study contributes to the grand challenge of 
understanding “the role and functioning of organiza-
tions during adverse natural and social events” in order 
to “better deal with disasters and ultimately benefit 
society as a whole” (van der Vegt et al., 2015: 971).

**How Do New Ventures Access Resources to Pursue 
Post-Disaster Opportunities?**

We found that Haitian-led initiatives emerged in re-
response to the earthquake disaster and created value by 
alleviating victims’ suffering. New ventures emerged as 
a response to gaps in the recovery system as broader 
institutional actors (e.g., Haitian and international gov-
ernments and NGOs) struggled to address the needs of 
hundreds of thousands of suffering people.

As illustrated in Figure 2 (and also Table 4), our 
findings reveal two important mechanisms for how 
ventures accessed resources to organize a response 
to alleviate suffering: engage available social re-
sources (Path 1a) and act on their founding mindset 
(Path 1b). These actions toward pursuing an op-
portunity are somewhat similar to extant research 
on venture founding, which has highlighted how 
greater access to social resources (Davidsson & 
Honig, 2003) and founders’ motivations can influence 
opportunity exploitation. Specifically, we found that 
social resource relationships served as a catalyst 
for subsequent resource acquisition techniques and 
played an important role in shaping whether a ven-
ture became transforming or sustaining in nature. As 
ventures drew upon resources through either strong 
social connections (transforming ventures) or trans-
actional interactions (sustaining ventures), differ-
ces emerged in these ventures’ ability to address 
diverse types of needs. Transforming ventures were able 
to leverage relationships to transition to satisfy addi-
tional needs, whereas sustaining ventures appeared to 
be stuck in a cycle of establishing new transactional 
relationships to extract resources to satisfy the most basic 
of needs. Therefore, in a post-disaster context, the nature 
of existing ties influences the boundaries of the POTAS 
and the strategies ventures pursue to obtain addi-
tional resources. These insights extend theory on 
the social resources of entrepreneurship on whether 
or not strong and/or weak ties facilitate venture 
emergence (Davidsson & Honig, 2003); the current 
study provides an understanding of how the nature
TABLE 3
Representative Quotations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension: Identification of potential opportunities to alleviate suffering (POTAS)</th>
<th>Surviving cases: 2nd and 1st order themes and representative quotations</th>
<th>Transforming cases: 2nd and 1st order themes and representative quotations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SE-E1: “While we sit here waiting for someone to give us something, it is almost like we are children . . . we have heard through television and radio that the government has plans to get us all out of these camps . . . So we wait and live in the tent community.”</td>
<td>TA-E2: “You have to put yourself in [others’] shoes . . . you have to do everything in your power to show them that they are surrounded by people who love them and who will stand by them.”</td>
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<td>SO-E1: “As I worked cleaning up and burying bodies people seemed to follow me. I set up camp here and have taken charge ever since . . . I know have a large following.”</td>
<td>Field Notes: “After interacting with several of the [sustaining ventures] we made sure in follow up questions to ask about whether [they] were interested in enhancing their community power. However, even when directly asked they deferred and said ‘we were just doing the right thing, we were obligated to protect our community, our morals call for it and we simply answered the call like anyone else would have.’ Pretty remarkable. Also, they placed a huge emphasis on getting people on their own feet. They even ceased providing food early in the recovery process because they felt that was not sustainable: they needed to enable others to become self-reliant.”</td>
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<td>Field Notes: “Today, they talked a lot about their status and role in the community. The others around us also emphasized this repeatedly saying ‘well, the founder is the boss, we do everything he says.’ Similarly, the way they described the founding was interesting, emphasizing how they were important and capable . . .”</td>
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<th>Dimension: Social resources</th>
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<td>SO-F1: “Foreigners who call themselves friends of Haiti have in reality stolen millions of dollars from our country. Thus, it would only be just for these countries to finance the cost of new houses—those who committed such odious crimes against the Haitian people should be the ones to finance and build houses for the population.”</td>
<td>TA-C1: “The foreign aid workers were very committed to the Haitian people and they gave support and relief with all of their hearts and all of their might . . . the Americans, French, and Canadians did genuinely show interest in learning who we were as a Haitian people and what we needed before they got to work.”</td>
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<td>Field Notes: “There seems to be a contradiction . . . While they rely heavily on outside resources for survival, they are bitter and even angry toward those resource providers, demanding even more from them all while calling them ‘invaders’ or ‘intruders.’ They do not seem to have long-standing relationships and every attempt at resources seems transactional, as if done for the first time.”</td>
<td>Field Notes: “What surprised us today was the diverse resources accessed through their networks. They had connections in the US and in the Dominican Republic that they were able to immediately access . . . [they] transitioned as rapidly as possible off international suppliers to locals. As they explained to us (and showed us), this allowed them to impact the community in multiple ways—helping victims, but also helping Haitian businesses get going again by using them for supplies.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field Notes: “Today, they talked a lot about their status and role in the community. The others around us also emphasized this repeatedly saying ‘well, the founder is the boss, we do everything he says.’ Similarly, the way they described the founding was interesting, emphasizing how they were important and capable . . .”</td>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension: Founding mindset</th>
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<td>SO-F1: “I am a politician and consider myself both a centrist and a revolutionary . . . I borrow a little from Dessalines, George Washington, and Joseph Stalin . . . I tell you this so you know where I’m coming from when I say the earthquake was a criminal event . . . I must continue to fight for justice for the people because the earthquake was a criminal event.”</td>
<td>TR-F1: “Our philosophy and motivation is this: we believe it is better to teach someone to fish instead of just giving people a fish when they come to you and say that they are hungry . . . this helps people become more self-sufficient.”</td>
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<td>Field Notes: “. . . many individuals from today’s interviews spent a lot of time explaining their Haitian heritage and fighting spirit. While they did want to help people, many viewed the earthquake as a small (but significant) extension of a history of Haitian suffering. In their minds, it was their chance to fulfill their duty as Haitians. . . . These feelings ran very deep.”</td>
<td>Field Notes: “Today, we interviewed several people from [TO] and they all said things like ‘well Haitians are like other nations, so nothing about that really influenced things’ or ‘we met amazing people from all nations, we’re no better or worse than them.’ Rather, they emphasized the moral obligation and desire they felt to help others in need. This is what they repeatedly offered as the main driver of their actions.”</td>
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TABLE 3  
(Continued)

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<th>Dimension: Resourcefulness</th>
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Surviving cases: 2nd and 1st order themes and representative quotations

SO-E2: “We recently found an organization that gives elderly participants 2,000 gourdes ($40), and we helped our elderly residents become beneficiaries of this program.”

Field Notes: “All ventures were resourceful, that much is certain. In fact, it seems that most people we have met in Haiti are resourceful. However, a key difference with some ventures [sustaining] take it to another level, doing things that are deviant at best, and illegal at worst. This includes occupying land for years, stealing resources, deceiving others, and so forth. They seem to have built this into their tasks as an organization as they appear in a perpetual state of ‘survival mode’, which seems to transcend other moral codes.”

Transforming cases: 2nd and 1st order themes and representative quotations

TA-F2: “While initially we staged our operation on the church grounds, this was not a permanent solution [it was not our land]. The earthquake hit on January 12... everyone had cleared the church grounds during the month of February.”

Field Notes: “Resourcefulness appears to be everywhere, however in some cases that can preclude investment in the future. However, some of the ventures appear to have overcome this by focusing on transition from resourceful actions to more investment-oriented actions. This is manifest in their view of others’ property (to be borrowed and returned, not taken), how they can help people (help them step up as opposed to giving them handouts), etc.”

of a social resource influences the types of entrepreneurial activities undertaken and the extent to which these activities return people to positive functioning over time.

Furthermore, ventures’ founding mindset served as an important framing of the issues at hand, including how to interpret the activities of other actors (e.g., governments, NGOs) and how to engage both those they helped and essential resource providers (Path 1b). Sustaining ventures interpreted the response from key institutional actors within the context of Haiti’s long history of suffering, which resulted in an emphasis on patriotism and a push to obtain justice for historic abuses. In particular, the disaster further heightened Haiti’s troubled history with property rights, as only a small number of elites laid claim to much of the land surrounding Port-au-Prince. Understandably, many sustaining ventures “took a stand” on property rights by occupying the land while lobbying for fundamental changes in Haiti’s ongoing housing and property situation. This mindset ultimately shaped the identification of POTAS—it was a key mechanism in explaining why sustaining ventures focused on satisfying only the basic needs of those who were suffering. In contrast, transforming ventures’ founding mindset was more detached from Haiti’s long history of injustices and more oriented toward solving current and future issues from one’s current situation—no matter how good or bad—by transitioning victims to a state of autonomy. This mindset served as a framing for subsequent action—there was no need to “hold out” for government action as there was no mindset that government action was critical; rather, transforming ventures emphasized the need to move forward with the resources on hand.

How and Why Venture Creation Facilitates Resilience?

As individuals accessed resources and took action, they began identifying POTAS. This model of taking action as a pathway to identifying opportunities contributes to the extant research on venture formation, highlighting the iterative and action-oriented perspective of opportunity identification and pursuit (Sarasvathy, 2001; Shepherd, 2015).

What is novel in our inductive model is the focus on opportunities to alleviate others’ suffering and the ways differences in the potential opportunities exploited influenced ventures’ impact on victims’ functioning. Sustaining ventures pursued potential opportunities to provide continuous relief through satisfying victims’ basic needs (i.e., food, water, and shelter), improving founders’ social standing (as community leaders), and allowing for a continued push for justice for historic grievances. These POTAS facilitated the entrenchment of early actions, the emergence of new power roles, and deviant actions (Path 2). In particular, sustaining ventures continued to engage resource providers with an injustice mindset, demanding resources but simultaneously reinforcing the transactional nature of resource exchanges. Combined, these efforts resulted in victims’ long-term dependence on the ventures to meet their most basic needs (Path 3).

In contrast, transforming ventures engaged in creative and legal approaches to acquiring and distributing resources, which enhanced their role as
adaptive need finders and fulfillers (Path 3). In taking this approach, transforming ventures identified POTAS to transition members of their communities from crisis to recovery to “building back better.” This approach reaffirmed social relationships as opposed to “burning bridges” with resource providers. Transforming ventures realized that pursuing resourceful action with their social connections could generate subsequent interactions to allow victims to continue to grow (autonomously) (Path 2). That is, each interaction was treated as a possible investment in the future as opposed to a one-time consumable exchange. Therefore, these ventures avoided interactions with resource providers that could be perceived as “exploitive” or “overly demanding,” and instead sought to develop sustainable relationships where resource providers functioned as “partners” rather than transactional donors. Combined, these efforts shaped a transformational long-term effort that facilitated resilience in victims who suffered in the aftermath of the disaster (Path 3). Therefore, although all the ventures studied were entrepreneurial in that they were innovative, took risks, and were proactive (Covin & Slevin, 1989), their entrepreneurial orientation was either directed at “forcing someone’s hand” to help the venture alleviate suffering (sustaining ventures) or at “taking the situation into their own hands” to take actions that put autonomy “back into the hands” of victims (transforming ventures).

**Contributions to Theory**

The primary contribution of the current study is a venturing model of disaster resilience. This contribution builds on the importance of understanding processes of resilience (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003), particularly in response to disasters (McEntire, 2014; van der Vegt et al., 2015). Here, we provide an important step in better understanding how new ventures’ different activities generate alternate forms of resilience after a disaster. Studies have suggested that resilience “reflects the ability of systems to absorb and recover from shocks, while transforming...
their structures and means for functioning in the face of long-term stresses, change, and uncertainty” (van der Vegt et al., 2015: 972). We extend these conceptualizations to emphasize gradients of promoting functioning in the aftermath of a disaster event. Sustaining ventures provided for basic needs (enabling functioning) that enhanced survival but resulted in victims developing a continued reliance on the venture, whereas while transforming ventures also initially provided for basic needs they transitioned victims to increasing levels of self-reliance. These findings provide an important theoretical contribution to understanding differences in the process and outcomes of resilience. While initial venturing activities that promote survival are necessary, they are not sufficient for the comprehensive alleviation of victim suffering—that is, to return victims to normal functioning or for post-disaster growth.

This study also contributes to theory by identifying new venture competencies that influence resilience—specifically, the nature of social resources and engagement in resourcefulness. Social resources are essential for new organizations as they are generally resource constrained and require external support (Burt, 2005; Stinchcombe, 1965). Therefore, it might be assumed that most relationships are useful, especially in the aftermath of disasters when seemingly any available resource would be valued. However, we found that when it came to alleviating others’ suffering and promoting the preservation and development of resources, the nature of social relationships in the study’s context played a critical role in determining whether victims could achieve normal functioning—building on emerging research that emphasizes social networks and how these function in contexts requiring “high-reliability” (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, & Sydow, 2015; Saz-Carranza & Ospina, 2011). Those who possessed strong and weak ties with outsiders and who viewed outsiders as collaborators and partners (as opposed to mere transactional donors) were able to mobilize resources that helped develop, build, and even transform those they helped. Interestingly, sustaining ventures faced (or created for themselves) a paradox where they recognized the importance of resources from outsiders yet were unable (through a lack of connections) and unwilling (through disdain for resource providers) to form effective relationships with these outside resource providers. These findings contribute to our knowledge of the obstructions to resource flow from outsiders to victims—some ventures are not well positioned socially to be brokers and do not have a mindset conducive for developing the relationships necessary to become such brokers.

Prior research has generally assumed that the possession of extensive and diverse resource reserves (i.e., resource slack) is useful in weathering challenging conditions (Meyer, 1982). We found that even in the most constrained of resource environments, ventures were created to alleviate suffering. In all cases, ventures were highly creative in what they perceived to be an available resource (consistent with bricolage [Baker & Nelson, 2005]). Our findings suggest that these resource perceptions (and subsequent actions) influence the alleviation of suffering. Creative, resourceful actions that were within legal bounds influenced stable and sustainable resource relationships and allowed transforming ventures to borrow and return resources. These actions not only developed strong resource partnerships but also facilitated the transforming ventures’ model of moving people toward self-reliance, autonomy, and—thus—resilience outcomes. In contrast, sustaining ventures used any and all means to obtain resources to achieve their ends, which resulted in fragmented resource relationships and a limited chance for victims to transition beyond basic “survival mode” while simultaneously creating a dependence on the venture. This finding suggests that there are forms of resourcefulness that have diminishing returns on the alleviation of suffering.

Although much of the research on resilience after disasters has focused on enhancing individual wellness, providing for basic needs, and helping to restore order (Bonanno et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2008), we found that an effective response to alleviating suffering involved a prosocial mindset that was focused on venturing to generate victim autonomy and self-reliance. While all ventures had some degree of prosocial orientation, transforming ventures repeatedly expressed that helping others was the primary reason for action and that their “true” motive was to put victims on a path to self-reliance. In contrast, sustaining ventures provided for victims’ basic needs but had no real plans for turning that work over to those they helped—beyond waiting for widespread institutional reform. Although prosocial motivation does not preclude the actor from also benefiting from his or her actions (Grant, 2007), this study extends the theory on prosocial behavior by offering a more “extreme” form of prosocial behavior: helping people so they no longer need help through
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path 1: (a) Social Resources, (b) → POTAS</th>
<th>Path 2: POTAS → Resourcefulness</th>
<th>Path 3: Resourcefulness → Alleviation of Suffering</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transforming Ventures</strong></td>
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<td>1a: “We used Skype to communicate with connections in [the Dominican Republic] and others in the United States... We were able to find food through contacts in the Dominican Republic... we actually had (temporarily) an airplane and a helicopter available for use... we used these to shuttle the most critically injured people to the Dominican Republic for treatment... I think that if they had not been able to go most of them would have ended up dying.” TO-F2</td>
<td>“Our view was we needed to help people become self-reliant, otherwise needs would persist. For example, if I am thirsty today and [someone] gives me water, but I know I will be thirsty again tomorrow and I have no idea where to go to find water to drink. Thus, they helped me for a short amount of time, but the same root problem is eventually going to resurface.” TR-F1</td>
<td>“We constructed tents, showers, and installed lights on borrowed land... however, this was not the end goal of our actions—each project step had an end date... after which we start new programs [that address current needs].” TR-F1</td>
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<td>1b: “I think that we as committee members were so absorbed in trying to solve other people’s problems that we forgot about our own issues; for example, my family was never here with me during the days following the earthquake, but I was never preoccupied with thoughts of missing them and wishing they were here with me, because I was so busy helping out with relief efforts.” TO-E1</td>
<td>“We identified some satellite phones that helped us connect. It was because of them that we were able to contact those outside Haiti that we knew. It allowed us to have constant communication before things returned to normal, so we were able to form a local committee to direct our operation [as opposed to having it directed from the outside].” TO-F2</td>
<td>“We were creative in getting people to take steps toward self-reliance, such as offering them rice and beans to leave the tents... we also worked with them to help them find employment. Some of these people living in the camp were able to go rent a house with their own money once they secured a job, and they moved out.” TR-F1</td>
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<td>“The use of materials that were not ours was always temporary. For example, we did not stay on the property long-term. Similarly, we made sure that people were not building homes on land they did not own, a practice that became very common after the earthquake.” TR-F2</td>
<td>“People’s situations were so different... imagine if you had a severed limb or needed transport to a hospital that was overflowed? Other people had no food to eat, they had no home to live in, members of their household had perished... and they had absolutely nobody to help them... This is why we were so absorbed as a committee in trying to understand needs and address the different problems... we needed multiple leadership positions who could all work together.” TO-E1</td>
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<td>Table 4 (Continued)</td>
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<td><strong>Path 1: (a) Social Resources, (b) → POTAS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sustaining Ventures</strong></td>
<td>“Our most pressing need is to get out of these tents . . . but we have no connections to get us shelter . . . and I don’t want to rent a room, renting does not even interest me, I would prefer to buy a room . . . so we continue to wait in the tents searching for food, using tarps and tents.” SE-E1</td>
<td>“Life as a leader is full of sacrifices, I have sacrificed a lot in searching for resources . . . but this builds my reputation, which is the only thing you can possess . . . reputation can make you rich in the end, but we are poor at the present.” SO-E1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>“Where will we be in two years, in five years? Well, we are waiting for those in charge to fulfill their duties in regards to us . . . so we continue searching and surviving.” SA-C1</td>
<td>“We got together and managed to buy a water truck and shared it. We had to do it that way to keep surviving . . . Ever since the founding there has been a leader and everybody knows that individual is the leader, he decides on resources like water that keep us together.” SE-F1</td>
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<td>1b</td>
<td>“As the president of this organization, I demand that our so-called friends or ally countries of Haiti who claim that they like Haiti should help take all of these people out.” SO-F1</td>
<td>“I dressed in a manner similar to a military personnel and went to the military to get gasoline . . . they assumed I was part of the military . . . I told them I needed gasoline and they told me no problem, they had a lot of gasoline. There were obstacles, but I overcame them . . . many people were afraid of the military . . . but not me, I told others ‘I’m not afraid of the military, because I am in the military too!’ I did this often to get resources.” SA-F1</td>
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<td>2016 2095 Williams and Shepherd</td>
<td>“To obtain food we went to the Industrial Park with the vehicle and pressured them, and they saw that we were serious because we had [falsified] badges already . . . We were obligated to use force to get these resources . . . we had no other choice but to use force to obtain these supplies for our community.” SO-E2</td>
<td>“There were some people who gave up and refused to eat, because they figured that they were going to die anyways. When things started looking up again due to our action, and we started finding more resources, then these people became interested in eating again.” SO-E2</td>
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<td>“Because we helped people find food, they would come up to me and pick me up in the air . . . for example, one man picked me up in the air and said ‘wow, here is the guy who saved my life, he saved my life!’ People recognize we saved them from starvation and death . . . this is how we are respected.” SA-E1</td>
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a relentless focus on enabling autonomy to obtain self-reliance.

Our findings also contribute to the management literature on disaster response, which focuses on the immediate impact of emergent response groups in developed economies (e.g., the United States [Majchrzak et al., 2007], Australia [Shepherd & Williams, 2014]). In this developing stream of management research, less has been offered regarding the internal dynamics of emergent ventures and the various ways these ventures’ activities influence people in the longer term, especially those in less developed countries. Over and above contributing to theory through a deeper understanding of the internal dynamics of an important form of emergent response group (i.e., transforming ventures), this study provides insights into the mindset of some that seem to create a vicious cycle in less developed countries. Because of past injustices, some ventures are unable to create the sort of relationships in the present that will help victims grow for the future—that is, they fail to “build back better.” This can create a deleterious spiral where distrust obstructs the formation of strong relationships, and the lack of strong relationships obstructs resource flow, which further fuels distrust and so on. However, some (transforming) ventures appear to be able to break this cycle by developing strong relationships with outside providers (given a different founding mindset) and using those resources to help victims in a way that gives these victims autonomy and builds self-reliance, which reinforces the founding mindset and social capital. This extends research on the effectiveness of emergent responses and lays a foundation for future research to explore how to enable and support emergent activities that show the greatest promise for alleviating suffering.

Finally, this study provides an important addition to the conceptualization of entrepreneurial opportunity by extending it to POTAS. This contributes to extant research on opportunity, which suggests that opportunities are future scenarios that are desirable and feasible and usually focus on creating economic, social, or community value (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006; York & Venkataraman, 2010). By extending the scope of entrepreneurial opportunity to the alleviation of suffering in the aftermath of a disaster, we open new pathways to add to the conversation on the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities (Suddaby, Bruton, & Si, 2015) and the diverse ways in which entrepreneurial actors can create value. Indeed, not all potential opportunities, once exploited, are equally as effective in alleviating victims’ suffering in the aftermath of a disaster. In extending theory on the value created by POTAS, we highlight that while ventures created to alleviate suffering pursue opportunities to enhance victims’ survival chances in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, some ventures create additional value by enabling transitions for individuals to achieve post-disaster resilience and growth.

Taken together, these findings have important practical implications, especially in terms of addressing the “grand challenge” of responding to disasters. Specifically, traditional response groups and resource providers might be well served in supporting emergent, grassroots, locally-led ventures seeking to develop resilience. This support could include assisting transforming ventures with difficult transitions and/or sustaining ventures in their immediate objectives (e.g., providing food and shelter). Similarly, recognizing ventures’ different objectives can guide resource providers and policymakers in prioritizing needs while also informing institutional actors (e.g., governments and NGOs) on how to interact with new local ventures. These actions can be oriented toward generating long-term resilience by encouraging pathways to self-reliance. Finally, various actors in post-disaster responses can consider important tradeoffs associated with different forms of action. For example, our data suggest that sustaining ventures’ decision to “hold out” for others’ support resulted in reduced resilience outcomes for many victims of the disaster. In contrast, transforming ventures focused on moving people forward while explicitly avoiding the approach taken by sustaining ventures. Understanding the various tradeoffs associated with different response options could lead to more “strategic” decision making and result in the alleviation of more suffering and the promotion of greater resilience.

Generalizability and Future Research

Although the purpose of our study is consistent with other qualitative research—to provide “local” (i.e., realistic and precise) interpretations of a phenomenon, which the researcher then places within a theoretical frame to provide the wherewithal for extension and advancement of the current theory” (Harrison & Corley, 2011: 410)—we can still begin to think about how the theory can be transferred outside the context in which it was induced (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Indeed, we believe that the current inductive model can serve as a basis for a more generalizable theory of venturing to alleviate suffering.
That is, we believe that the creation of ventures to alleviate suffering in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake is representative of a larger set of emergent responses to disasters in least developed countries (Guillaumont, 2010; UN, 2015) by locals in the “eye of the storm.” Ventures are created to respond to disasters (e.g., Shepherd & Williams, 2014) and our inductive theoretical model directly applies to explaining how these ventures are organized and their impact on victim suffering. Furthermore, responses to disasters in least developed countries also come from outside organizations, such as the United Nations, foreign governments, the Red Cross, and others that actively try to engage locals to customize and speedily deliver resources to alleviate suffering in the aftermath of disasters (primarily in least developed countries). Our model helps explain how a venturing perspective for alleviating victim suffering can provide insights into the resource-investment strategies of these organizations and the human impact of those investments.

As the management research in this context is in its earliest stages, we anticipate many opportunities for future research to address aspects of this grand challenge. Future research can make a contribution by: (1) identifying how to support and facilitate transforming ventures through disaster-preparation and response programs, especially in less developed economies. For example, how can other emergency responders interact with and support local ventures as part of a broader approach to addressing disaster-caused suffering? Research can also: (2) explore differences across disaster types (i.e., human-caused versus natural disasters) and economic environments. For example, do more developed economies have a lower tolerance for living in “sustaining” conditions such that there is a more rapid transition to a “transforming” path, or is “sustaining” simply manifest in a less extreme way? Next, research can: (3) investigate how transforming firms sequence and/or balance activities that promote survival and response speed with those that provide autonomy and self-reliance and can: (4) highlight how network development facilitates both disaster response and locally-organized responses to ongoing poverty and economic crises. Contributions are also likely to come from: (5) exploring how individuals can develop a prosocial mindset to facilitate venturing that aids those in need by helping them help themselves. Recent research emphasizes the importance of programs that engage local participation in “poverty targeting, [improving] service delivery, [expanding] livelihood opportunities and [strengthening] demand for good governance” (Mansuri & Rao, 2012: 1). These programs typically focus on supporting governments and organizations in developing institutions. Future research can build on our findings to improve responses to long-term needs. In addition: (6) comparing entrepreneurial action in the context of post-disaster venturing with that in more traditional contexts can advance our theories on the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities, the processes of organizational emergence, and the forms of value creation.

Finally, although we highlight the benefits of transforming ventures over sustaining ventures, this could be a function of this study’s time horizon. All sustaining ventures described in this study still occupy land without the permission of the legal owners of that land. With a longer time horizon, we may find that sustaining ventures fundamentally challenge and change the nature of property rights and/or lead to a redistribution of those rights in a way that has a profound and positive impact on reducing the suffering caused by poverty in Haiti. Future research can explore the possibilities of this institutional entrepreneurship.

**CONCLUSION**

While disasters pose a great challenge to society at large, management scholarship likely has much to add in providing solutions that facilitate network and organizational development, leadership training, entrepreneurship, foreign investment, for-profit market development, and so forth. Specifically, as we found in this paper, locals—even in the most difficult of circumstances—are capable of pursuing potential opportunities to alleviate suffering and build resilience in communities to varying degrees. Recognizing how these ventures identify and utilize resources and to what ends can facilitate better coordination and organizing to alleviate suffering in the aftermath of a disaster. Moreover, least developed countries are in the greatest need of attention as their inhabitants endure the lowest levels of global economic privilege and are the most susceptible to the risks associated with disasters. However, as we found, they have much to offer in developing solutions that facilitate resilience.

**REFERENCES**


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<th>Author(s)</th>
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<th>Journal</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Venture</strong></th>
<th><strong>Primary resource sources</strong></th>
<th><strong>Members (peak / current)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Primary activities (Initial)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Primary activities (Subsequent / current)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Lifespan</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Sogeun      | Foreign aid, NGO funds, rent from tent-city businesses | 38 / 22 | • Organize locals for cleanup and burying of the dead  
• Search for food, water, and shelter  
• Organizing a tent city, including governance  
• Communications, bargaining as a collective for NGO resources | • Security and rule enforcement  
• Access to food, water, and other basic services in the tent city  
• Access to shelter | 3 years / ongoing |
| Seleco      | Foreign aid, NGO funds, community connections, Red Cross | 34 / 15 | • Organize search and rescue  
• Search for water and shelter  
• Organize a tent city, including governance  
• Communicate with Red Cross  
• Develop leadership team and structure for a unified response  
• Search and rescue; burying of the dead | • Security and rule enforcement  
• Access to water and shelter  
• NGO interfacing and government lobbying | 3 years / ongoing |
| Sagesse     | Foreign aid, NGO funds, rent from tent-city businesses | 38 / 6 | • Search for food, water, and shelter  
• Search and rescue; burying of the dead  
• Urgent medical treatment including extraction from Haiti  
• Organizing of food and water procurement and delivery  
• Shelter in temporary structures | • Government and NGO lobbying  
• Access to shelter  
• Modest psychological services  
• Transition to permanent living structures  
• Services such as finding rentals, new land, or home repair  
• Job or career training | 3 years / ongoing |
| Toujours    | Direct donations, work-for-services, NGO donations, services for pay and exchange, community network connections | 49 / NA | • Search and rescue; burying of the dead  
• Search for food, water, and shelter  
• Urgent medical treatment including extraction from Haiti  
• Organizing of food and water procurement and delivery  
• Shelter in temporary structures | • Work-service exchanges such as repairing a school in exchange for enrollment  
• Transition to permanent living structures  
• Services such as finding rentals, new land, or home repair  
• Psychological counseling  
• Orphan rescue, housing, and placement services (since spun-off) | 2 years |
| Tangage     | Direct donations, services for pay and exchange, NGO donations, community network connections | 42 / NA | • Search and rescue; burying of the dead  
• Organizing of food and water procurement and delivery  
• Shelter in temporary structures | • Transition to permanent living structures  
• Services such as finding rentals, new land, or home repair  
• Temporary job agency services  
• Government-initiatives such as debris cleanup | 2.5 years |
| Travailleurs| Direct donations, work-for-services, NGO volunteers, community network connections | 51 / 8 | • Search and rescue; burying of the dead  
• Food and water distribution  
• Security and law enforcement  
• Shelter in temporary structures | • Transition to permanent living structures  
• Services such as finding rentals, new land, or home repair  
• Temporary job agency services  
• Government-initiatives such as debris cleanup | 3 years / ongoing |

* Names have been changed to protect anonymity.